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The Imperative of Immigration Reform
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Cornell University
lilts death is a classic symptom of the problem with our politics; the
special interest prevails over the general interest...l With this epitaph
one member of the congressional conference committee summedup the
fate of the immigration reform package that died within his committee in
October, 1984. The bill under consideration was popularly known as the
Simpson-Mazzoli bill. It represented the latest unsuccessful effort of a
quest that began in the early 1970s by Congress to come to grips with the
nation's outmoded and out-of-control immigration system.2
The Simpson-Mazzoli bill was not a panacea for the nation's immigration
ills. It represented only the first step of what eventually must be a series
of legislative moves to assure that the immigration system contributes to the
nation's economic welfare and does not con~ravene such goals. For although
the Simpson-Mazzoli bill did contain other features, it was primarily addressed
at illegal immigration. As important as is this issue, it is a fundamental
mistake to assume that abuse of the existing system is the only problem with
the nation's immigration system.. To the contrary the nation's immigration system
is in need of a complete overhaul. Illegal immigration is only the most
obvious symptom that something is wrong.
It was the original intention of this paper to discuss why the Simpson-
Mazzoli bill was only the first and not the final step in the immigration
2reform process. The defeat of this bill -- which, incidentally, the noted
authority on immigration history, Oscar Handlin, has correctly called "a
more liberal measure than any we've had in 90 yearsll3 -- means that the reform
movement is back to square one. Hence, it is not yet possible to speak only
about the agenda that 1ies IIbeyond Simpson-r.1azzoli. II The whole issue of
immigration reform still remains to be again addressed.
The Issue in Brief Perspective
There are only two ways for a nation to acquire its labor force: people
Through-are born within its boundaries or they immigrate from other nations.
out most of the 19th and early 20th Century, immigration was the most important
component of the nation's human resource policy. The imposition of the nation's
fi.rst numerical ceilings on immigration i.n the 1920s were followed by several
decades of depression, war, and their immediate aftermaths. As a consequence,
immigration diminished significantly in terms of its human resource importance
from the early 1~20s to the early 1960s. Because of this diminished role
over this forty year period, many scholars and policymakers have been slow to
recognize that since the mid-1960s, immigration -- in all of its diverse
forms -- has again become a major feature of the U.S. economy. The 1980
Census revealed that since 1970 the number of foreign born Americans had in-
creased sharply after declining each previous decade since 1920 and it dis-
closed that one of every 10 people in the country reported speaking a language
other than English at home. As there was a substantial statistical undercount
of the illegal immigration. population, it is certain that the dramatic
findings of the size of the foreign born population in 1980 are significantly
understated. Noting the developments, leon Bouvier observed in 1981 that
"immigration now appears to be almost a5 important as fertility insofar as
3u.s. population growth is concerned.1I4 As the labor force is the principal
means by which population changes are transmitted to the nation's economy,
Bouvier warned that IIthere is a compelling argument for close co-ordination
between the formulation of employment and immigration po1iCy.1I5 Recognition
of this critical linkage is the basis for the drive for immigration reform
in the 1980s.
The Ability of Policy to Affect labor Force Trends
The preponderance factors that influence labor force trends within an
economy are beyond the realm of po1icymakers to influence even if they want
to do so. labor market research has repeatedly shown, for instance, that race
and gender can influence employment and income experiences of the labor force.
As the number and proportion of minorities and womenhave increased in the
labor force, there is nothing that human resource po1icymakers can do to change
these trends. They can only respond with adjustment policies designed to in-
f1uence the factors that cause these outcome differentials to occur. The same
can be said for demographic changes in the age distribution of the labor force;
or the shift in social. values that have contributed both to the dramatic increase
in female labor force participation; or the effects of the pace and scope of
technological change on the preparation of workers for jobs. The control of
immigration flows, however, is considered to be an exercise in the use of the
discretionary powers of the state. As such it is one dimension of a nation's
human resource policy that should be capable of directive action rather than
forced reaction.
Immigration has economic implications for the participants and for the
receiving society. It can determine labor force trends as well as respond to
them. For this reason, the efficacy of policies that regulate immigration
4must be judged in terms of how they related to broader labor force trends
at any prevailing time. As will soon be apparent, this is decidedly not
the case in the United States as of the mid-1980s.
The Influence of Administrative Structure
Because the magnitude and composition of immigration flows are supposedly
subject to direct regulation by human institutions, it is essential to under-
stand how the policy making process functions. There is only tangential
mention of immigration in the Constitution. By the late Nineteenth Century,
however, the Supreme Court had concluded that the federal government was the
exclusive governmental body to assume this responsibility.6 After a brief
assignment of power to the Department of the Treasury and later to the Depart-
me~t of Commerce and Labor, the administration of immigration policy was
shifted to the newly established U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) in 1914. This
action represented a clear recognition by policymakers of the time that labor
market considers~ions should be a primary concern in the administration of
immigration policy. In 1933, by executive. order, the immigration and the
naturalization functions (which had been separately administered in DOL) were
joined into one agency -- the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
The INS has continued ever since to be responsible for the implementation of
immigration policy. .
.'
With the recognition in 1940 of the likely involvement of the United
States in World War II, a critical decision was made that has had lasting
influence on the course of , immigration policy. In June, 1940, the INS was
shifted from DOLto the U.S. Department of Justice. Ostensibly, the shift
was necessary for national security reasons. It was belie~ed that rapidly
changing international events dictated i more effective means of control
5over immigrants and non-immigrants. Concern over the entry and presence of
subversive foreign elements in the population was elevated to the highest
priority mission of the agency. Labor market considerations -- the historic
concern -- were shunted aside.
Whenthe war ended, the INS remained in the Department of Justice. The
long run effects of this administrative change have been disastrous to efforts
to build a coherent immigration policy -- especially if one of the concerns
is that immigration policy should be congruent with domestic labor force
trends. The Department of Justice has multiple responsibilities and, when
compared to its numerous other important duties, immigration matters have
tended to be neglected or relegated to a low order of priority. Moreover,
the Department of Justice is one of the most politically sensitive agencies
in the federal government. It has often" opted for short run expedient
solutions for immigration issues. It has seldom manifested any interest in
the economic aspects and consequences of immigration.
Another lasting effect of the shift of immigration policy to the Justice
Department has been that the two judiciary committees of Congress gained the
responsibility for supervision over immigration in general and the INS in
particular. Traditionally, membership on these committees has been reserved
(often exclusively) for lawyers. The result, as noted by David North and
Allen LeBel, is that lias immigration problems arise, be they major or minor,
perceived or real, the response of lawyer-legislators is that the law should
be changed. II] As a consequence, immigration law in the United States has
become extremely complex and legalistic. In addition to these laws, it is
also the case that INS operations are governed by more than 5,000 pages of
written rules. Over the years, the labor market implications of immigration
policy have either been ignored or given only superficial attention by INS.
6The Nature of the Existing Immigration System
Before discussing the reform of the extant immigration system, it is
necessary to outline briefly what is the current system. To do this, it is
necessary to look at the major policy components -- those that pertain to
legal immigration, refugees, asylees, and illegal immigration. For the sake
of brevity, I am not going to discuss the complex topics of non-immigrant
labor policy or of border commuter labor policy which are also part of this
system and are also in dire need of reform.
Legal immigration policy
The revival of legal immigration as an influential force can be virtually
dated to the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965. It represented the
culmination of decades of efforts to pu~ge the nation's immigration system
of the overt racism that had been the central focus of the "nationa1 origins
system" that was adopted in 1924. After years of active struggle, the Civil
Rights movement achieved its capstone goal -- the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Just as overt racism could no longer be tolerated in the way
citizens were treated by fellow citizens, neither could racism be practiced
by the laws that govern the way in which non-citizens were considered for
immigrant admission.
The restrictive features of the "nationa1 origins system" had done more
than shape the racial and ethnic composition of immigrant flows. It had
sharply distorted the total flow of immigrants. Some nations with large
quotas (e.g., Great Britain which was entitled to about 40 percent of all of
the available visas) did not use all of the slots available to it while other
nations (e.g., Italy and Greece) with small quotas had massive backlogs of
would-be immigrants. Hence, during the years 1952 to 1965, for example,
7only 61 percent of the available quotas were actually used despite the fact
that tens of thousands of persons were precluded from admission because they
came from the "wrong II country. Succeeding administrations in the post-World
War II era were forced, therefore, to seek ad hoc legislation and to use
parole powers given to the Attorney General to admit hundreds of thousands
of refugees for both humanitarian and national interest considerations. As
a consequence, one of every three persons admitted to the United States from
1952 to 1965 entered outside the terms of the prevailing immigration system.
Hence, because the system was outdated by the progression of both world and
domestic events, the Immigration Act of 1965 wAs adopted.
It is important to note that while the changes enacted in 1965 signif-
icantly changed the character of the existing system, the reform movement
could not entirely escape the heavy hand of the past. Thus, while overt
racism was eliminated in 1965, the new act elevated family reunification to
the role of being the dominant admission factor. On the surface this might
seem to be a humane feature but the motivation for the changes was far for
less noble. The change was made in the judiciary committee of the House
of Representatives where some congressional supporters were more concerned
with finding a way to retain the national origins system under a covert guise.




they would have had fewer chances to have relatives who could use their
presence as a means to admit new immigrants. Thus, reliance on family uni-
fication would largely benefit those groups who had large quotas under the
older system. The Johnson'Administration opposed this move. It sought to
retain both the priority and the emphasis of labor market considerations as
the highest preference criterion {which had been the case since the use of
8a preference system to determine immigrant priorities was formally established
in 1952). Congress, however, made family reunification the dominant admission
factor. The Johnson Administration was forced to accept the change as the
price of getting rid of the national origins admission system. Labor market
considerations were downgraded to both lower pteferences and to a sharply
reduced number of visa allotments. The ostenSible reasons for the reversal
or priorities was that during the era when labor market factors dominated the
system has not used all of the available slots. But as already noted, the
reason for the inability to use all of the available slots between 1952-65
was the distortion imposed by the "national origins system" -- not the
concept of labor force priority itself.
In the years since 1965, there have been a number of minor changes in
the immigration system but they have retained this focus on family reuni-
fication. The system as of early 1984 sets a single world wide admission
ceiling of 270,000 visas to be issued each year. No more than 20,000 visas
are to be allotted to the would-be immigrants of anyone country. The
"immediate re1atives" of each visa holder, however, are not counted in
either ceil ing. Immediate relatives are spouses, children, and parents of
U.S. citizens over age 21. To decide which specific individuals are to be
granted such a visa within the framework of these numerical ceilings, a
six category preference system exists. The categories rank the preferences
in order with a certain proportion of the total visas reserved for each
preference. Four of the categories (which account for 80 percent of the
visas) are reserved for persons who are family related. Thus, family re-
unification has since 1965 become the mainstay of the legal immigration
9sys tem. The two remaining admission categories are based on labor market
principles.
each year.
They account for the remaining 20 percent of the available visas
For these two labor market categories, a person must secure a
certification from the Department of Labor that states that the presence of
the immigrant will not adversely effect the job opportunities and prevailing
labor force standards of citizen workers. In addition to the preference
categories, Congress has established 33 separate classes of people who are
specifically excluded from being admitted (e.g., paupers, prostitutes,
'Nazis, communists, facists, homosexuals, etc.) no matter if. they would other-
wise be eligible to be an immigrant..
It should also be noted that between 1965 and 1980, a separate preference
group existed for refugees with 17,400 slots. Over that interval, however,
the actual number of refugee admissions greatly exceeded this ceiling
(averaging about 50,000 persons a year). The excesses were admitted through
the use of the parole authority given to the Attorney General to admit
.
'persons for "emergent reasons. II Because the use of the parole powers was
finally admitted to be what it was -- a means of circumventing the existing
immigration statutes, refugees were removed from the established immigration
system in 1980. With the Refugee Act of 1980, they are admitted under a
separate procedure. Since 1982, the President arbitrarily sets the number
of refugees to be admitted in advance of each fiscal year. He then must
consult with Congress over the appropriateness of the suggested figure.
number of refugees approved for 1984, for instance, was 72,000 persons.
The
Obviously, there are no labor market considerations applied to the entry
eligibility refugees.
10
The Refugee Act of 1980 also created an asylee policy for the United
Sta tes. As opposed to a refugee (who is a person living outside of his
or her home nation and who fears persecution if forced to return but who is
not presently in the United States), an asylee is a person who also fears
similar persecution if he or she returns to his or her homeland but is
already physically present in the United States. The Refugee Act of 1980
As of early 1984, thereauthorized up to 5,000 asylee admissions a year.
were over 173,000 asylee requests pending approval and it is likely that
this number will continue to grow. As with refugees, there are no labor
market considerations applied to asylees.
Having discussed the IIfront doorll approaches to the nations labor market,
it is necessary to add that there is a massive IIback doorll approach as well.
Although the legal system is extremely complex in its objectives, the entire
system can be easily circumvented by those who enter illegally~ Unlike most
other nations, there are no penalties on employers who hire illegal immigrants
in the United States. Virtually all illegal immigrants who are caught are
given a IIvoluntary departurell back to their homeland. Hence, there is
virtually no deterrence associated with the violation of the existing system.
There is no system of work permits or of national identification and those
forms of identification that are available as easily counterfeitable.
Moreover, the INS has always been chronically understaffed and underfunded
relative to the duties it is assigned. All evidence indicates that most
illegal il111ligrants come to the United States to find jobs. -- not for purposes
of securing welfare or for criminal purposes. No one, of course, knows the
exact number of illegal immigrants who compose the stock of the illegal
immigrant population or the annual flow. In its final report in 1981, the
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy cited a range of from
11
3.5 to 6 million illegal immigrants. Their estimate, however, was based
upon a review provided by the Census Bureau of a variety of previous studies
done in the early and mid-1970s. Thus, whatever the validity of the estimate
included in the Select Commission's report, it should be understood that it
was based on the averaging of data for the mid-1970s -- not the mid-1980s.
Given the certainty that illegal immigration has increased since the mid-
1970s, the stock and flows are no doubt greater now than those cited by the
Commission's Report. In 1984, the INS apprehended 1,056,905 illegal immigrants.
Many of these people were apprehended more than" once. But, on the otherhand,
most illegal immigrants -- especially those from countries other than Mexico --
are never caught. Hence, the magnitude of the stock and annual flows of
illegal immigrants cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy.
Labor Market Impacts of the Era
of Renewed Immigration
There is a paucity of credible research on the precise employment ex-
periences of all groups of post-1965 immigrants. There is no statistical
data base to measure the labor force status of immigrants comparable to the
information compiled by the monthly Current Population Survey for all workers
in the United States. All that are available are administrative statistics;




foreign born population supplied by the decenial census count. From these
disparate sources, however, it is possible to discern some likely tendencies.
An awareness of these tendencies and their logical conclusions is prerequisite
to an understanding the macro-economic effects of immigration to the nation.
12
The Immigrant Infusion to the Supply of Labor Has Increased
The annual flow of legal immigrants since 1965 has more than doubled the
annual flow that existed for the period 1924 to 1965. For the earlier periodt
the annual flow was 191tOOOimmigrants and immediate relatives; for the period
1965 to 1981t the number has increased to an annual average of 435tOOO; for
the years 1978 to 1981 t it was 547tOOO. These figures do not include those
refugees who have yet to adjust their status to become resident a1ienst or
those asy1ees whose status is still pendingt or any illegal immigrants. If
all flows are consideredt it is likely that immigration in the 1980s is ac-
counting for as much as half of the annual growth in the population and
probably an even greater percentage of the real growth of the labor force.8
The Size of the Annual Flow of Immigrants Has No Regard for Domestic Labor
Market Conditions .
The aggregate number of immigrants and immediate relatives admitted each
year is completely independent of the prevailing labor market conditions. The
number of immigrants annually admitted has in no way been influenced by the
tightness or looseness of the domestic labor market. If allowance is also
made for refugees admitted since 1965 and for the tide of illegal immigrants
that have entered over this same periodt immigration has steadily added sub-
stantia1 numbers of additional workers regardless of the cyclical ability of
. . .
the economy to provide sufficient jobs for citizen or immigrant workers. This
practice is at total variance with the practice of most of the handful of
other countries that have been admitting immigrants over .this same period.
Immigrants Have A Higher Labor Force Participation Rate
The few studies that have focused upon labor force participation of
immigrants reveal that the majority of immigrants over age 16 do enter the
13
labor force. Indeed, they. show that the actual labor force participation
rate for legal immigrants and their immediate relative is likely to be con-
siderably -- not margina11y-- higher than that of the general popu1ation.9
There is no such dat~, of course, for illegal immigrants but it is in-
tuitively obvious that their labor force participation rates are higher than
those of legal immigrants. Illegal immigrants are primarily job seekers.
They are legislatively ineligible for many of the transfer programs that
might provide alternative income sources. The case with refugees, however,
its not quite so clear. Refugees prior to the '1970s seem to have had a
relatively easier adjustment process to labor force entry than have large
infusions of refugees from Southeast Asia that have occurred since the mid-
1970s. Refugees have been eligible not only for federal income transfer
programs but also for local and state programs that are available to citizen
programs.
Immigration Supplies Workers Independent of the Macro HumanResource Needs of
the Economy
For the overwhelming proportion of those persons who have immigrated to
the United States, they have been admitted without regard to their skill,
education, or geographic settlement preferences. As noted earlier, 80 percent
of the persons who receive visa~ to immigrate are admitted because the immi-
gration system gives preference to family reunification principles. Immediate
relatives of all immigrants are admitted regardless of their labor force
credentials as are all refugees and all would-be asylees. This is not meant
to imply that those who are admitted under these procedures lack talents but,
14
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rather as David North and Allen LeBel have observed, they lido so accldently."
Accordingly it is estimated that only above 5 percent of all those persons
admitted to the United States each year are required to have labor certifi-
cations that indicate they are filling established labor force needs. If
illegal immigrants are included,of course, this small percentage of certified
workers would be reduced to an infinitesimal number if compared to the total
flow of immigrant workers.
The Immigrant Flow is Predominately Composed of Members of Minority Groups
The most important qualitative change in the personal characteristics
of immigrants that has occurred since the end of. the national origins system,
has been the complete shift in the regions of origin of the immigrants. Almost
80 percent of the immigrants and refugees admitted during the 1970s were from
Latin America and Asia. In the 1980s, the percentage is even higher (close
to 84 percent). Beginning with the decade of the 1960s, Europe was replaced
for the first time in the nation's history by Latin America as the leading
source of immigrants. By the 1970s, Asia which was now free from the dis-
criminatory features of the previous immigration system, was challenging
Latin America for that distinction.
The last time that a European nation was among the top five of the
countries that supply immigrants to the United States was in 1973 (when Italy
placed fifth). Mexico has become the country that annually supplies the most
immigrants; the Philippine Islands have tended to be the runner-up. The
other sources vary from year to year but, since 1974, they have all been
located in either Asia or the Caribbean area.
{
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The predominance of immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean
area can be easily explained in terms of the priority given to family re-
unification in the admissions system. For Asians, the explanation is more
complex. It would seem t~at the family reunification system should have
worked against many Asian groups, given the exclusionary features that were
in effect for much of the pre-1965 era. The answer to this paradox in the
fact that Asians have made astute use of the occupational preferences as well
as the fact that they have overwhelmingly dominated the massive refugee flows
for each year since the mid-1970s. In the first case, the Asian immigrants
have tended to be highly skilled and educated; in the latter instance, they
have usually been unskilled and poorly educated.
Likewise, the illegal immigrant flows have also come predominately from
Mexico and the Caribbean Area. The best approximations are that about 60
percent of the illegal immigrants to the United States come from Mexico and
about 20 percent come from other countries of the Caribbean area.
remaining 20 percent come from other nations of the world.
The
Without doubt, therefore, the combined immigrant flows are overwhelmingly
composed of persons from minority groups (Hispanics, blacks, and Asians). As
will be discussed later, there is a strong clustering pattern of these immi-
grants into local labor markets of the central cities of a few large states
that are already composed of persons from similar racial and ethnic backgrounds.
As a result, it is very likely that many immigrants compete directly with
other citizen minority workers for available jobs. The competition is most
likely to be most adverse in' the lower skilled occupations. For the higher
skilled legal immigrants, the competition for employment opportunities is
more broadly based and, accordingly, the impact is less severe.
16
It is likely, therefore, that since 1965 immigration in general -- but
illegal immigration and refugee flows in particular -- has tended to adversely
affect the employment, unemployment and labor force participation rates of
minority citizens. The geographical concentration of immigrants in a few
large metropolitan areas has also tended to moderate wage increases for all
workers who compete with them in these same labor markets in general but with
t . 1 11minority group citizens in par lCU are To the degree this has happened,
uncontrolled immigration has worked at cross purposes with other federal
human resource policies that have been initiated over these same years that
have been designed principally to improve the economic opportunity for these
same minority citizen groups.
The Occupational Patterns of Immigrants Differ Extensively From Those of the
labor Force As a Whole
With specific reference to the occupational patterns of immigrants, the
occupational distribution of those admitted as legal immigrants is skewed
toward professional, technical, and skilled workers. The pattern is due
largely to the fact that the complex admission system is biased toward those
who have family connections as well as the time and the money that it takes
to work their way through the labyrinth of the legal immigration system. For
the minority who are admitted under the two occupational preferences and who,
by virtual definition do not have family relatives who are citizens, the two
occupational preferences generally favor those with high skills and extensive
educational backgrounds. Persons who are likely to become "public charges",
for instance, are specifically excluded from becoming legal immigrants. Further-
more, because of the extensive backlog of visa applications (over 1.2 million
visa applications were pending at the end of 1982), there have been no visas
17
available since 1978 for the non-preference "catch all" category that theo-
retically exists. Thus, it is not surprising that the occupational character-
istics are skewed differently from the distribution of the labor force as a
whole.
It appears from studies by David North of a cohort of 1970 immigrants
and a study by Barry Chiswick of the foreign born who entered the U.S. up
to 1970, that the earnings of immigrants tends to be initially below those
of citizen workers in comparable occupations but that these differences
gradually vanish in 11 to 15 years.12 Chiswick, in fact, found that male
innnfgrants actually end up doing better than citizen workers in comparable
occupations after about 20 years in the country. He was unable to make
conclusive findings about female immigrants. It is of consequence to note
that Chiswick found that immigrants from Mexico and the Philippines (the two
countries that have been the largest sources of legal immigrants since 1962)
were the least likely to sustain these favorable results.
In reviewing, Chiswick1s ambitious research on this subject, it is vital
to keep in mind that his analysis is of all foreign-born who had entered the
United States prior to 1970. It has been after 1970, however, that the
full effects of the Immigration Act of 1965 and the Refugee Act of 1980 have
occurred. As North has noted, the 1970 census data on the foreign-born "is
a group composed of persons of above average age, most of whomcame to the
U.S. many years earlier and under provisions of earlier legislation.J3 As
a consequence he warns about the use of this data as a reference group since
"one must not assume that the profile of the foreign-born which emerged from




Likewise, the sizeable increases in the number of illegal immigrants --
since the 1960s -- especially those from Mexico and the Caribbean Basin --
have been dominated by low and unskilled workers which also challenge any
complacent deductions tha~ would seem to be the logical conclusions of some
of the existing literature. In Chiswick's work, for instance, there is no
way to separate the experience of legal immigrants for illegal immigrants
since he is studying the foreign born as reported by the Census. It is
certain that the illegal immigrant population is severely undercounted in
the Census and, accordingly, it is likely that "their experiences are not
adequately captured by this data base.
Onestudy that has made use of the 1980 Census and its data on the foreign
born was done by Gregory DeFreitas and Adriana Marshall found that over one-
third of all immigrants were employed in manufacturing (compared to 23 percent
of native born workers.y5 In many metropolitan areas, the concentration was
more severe -- 75 percent of all manufacturing workers in Miami were immi-
grants; over 40 percent of those in Los Angeles and New York City; 25 percent
in San Francisco; and 20 percent in Chicago and Boston. In 35 metropolitan
areas with a population of one million or more immigrants comprised 19
percent of all production jobs in manufacturing. Not surprisingly, given the
occupational, industrial and geographic concentration of the immigrant work
force, the study found that the rate of wage growth in manufacturing was
inversely related to the size of the immigrant population in those metropolitan
areas. The high concentration of foreign born workers had a statistically
significant negative impaci on wage growth compared to the experience with
large metropolitan areas with lower percentages of foreign born workers.
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Given that the illegal immigrant flows into the labor force since 1965
are likely to have matched and probably exceeded the legal flows, it is es-
sential that the labor market experiences of illegal immigrants be specifically
included in any effort to assess the overall impact of immigrants on the labor
market. There are only two studies that have been able to make a serious
attempt to capture some measure of these patterns. One was a nationwide study
made of apprehended illegal immigrants by David North and Marion Houstoun in
1976.16 The second was a study made of unapprehended illegal immigrants in
Los Angeles in 1979 by a research team from the University of California at
Los Angeles (UCLA).17 Both studies were funded by the U.S. Department of
Labor. In the North and Houstoun study, the respondents had been in the
United States for an average of 2.5 years while in the UCLAstudy the mean
was 4.0 years.
The occupational patterns of the respondents in the two studies showed
conclusively that illegal immigrants are concentrated in the unskilled oc-
cupations of farm workers, service workers, non-farm laborers as well as the
semi-skilled blue collar occupations of operatives. A significant number are
also in the skilled blue collar occupation of craft workers.
found in any white collar occupation.
Very few were
A comparison of the data from these two studies shows that the occupational
-
,
patterns of illegal immigrants closely resembles those of Mexican Americans
(Chicanos) and of blacks. The employment pattern of Chicanos, in fact, better
resembles the pattern of illegal immigrants than it does the general distribution
pattern of the labor force.
It seems certain that the illegal immigrant workers are concentrated
in the secondary labor market of the U.S. economy where they often compete
20
with the millions of citizen workers who also are work and seek-work in this
sector. Indeed, ~1alcolm Lovell, the Under Secretary of Labor in his testimony
to Congress in support of immigration reform stated that "in 1981, close to
30 percent of all workers. employed in this country, some 29 million people,
were holding down the same kind of low-skilled industrial, service, and farm
jobs in which illegals typically find employment.1I18
Illegal immigrants are by no means the only cause of unemployment and
persistent low income patterns among certain sub-groups of the American labor
force but they certainly are ~ factor. The formulation of any serious full
employment strategy for the United States in the 1980s, therefore, will have
to include measures to curtail illegal immigration.
Thus, it would appear that the occupational impact of legal immigrants
is'at the upper end of the nations occupational structure while the impact
of illegal immigrants is at the lower end. Studies that combine these two
groups to obtain an average measure of the experience of immigrants on the
labor force miss the actual significance of the real impact.
The Locational Impact of Immigrants Is Extremely Unequal
One of the most pronounced effects of the unguided immigration system
is that legal immigrants are highly concentrated into a relatively few major
labor markets. Since 1966, California and NewYork have consistently ac-
counted for almost half of the intended residences of all legal immigrants.
Texas, Florida, NewJersey and Illinois account for about one quarter of the
remainder. Thus, six states have received almost three-quarters of all of
the legal immigrants. Data from the 1980 Census also confirm this high
concentration rate of the total foreign born population in the same states
21
(the percentage of foreign born in California was 14.8 percent, NewYork
13.4 percent, NewJersey 10.3, Florida 10.9, Illinois 7.3 and Texas 6.0;
the only other state with a large foreign born population was Hawaii with
14.0 percent).19
Within the states in which they settle, legal immigrants have demonstrated
a consistent preference in the 1970s for the large central citiesfO Although
the exact percentages varies each year, a central city was the destination of
about 55 percent of the immigrants who were admitted between 1960 and 1979.
Urban areas -- those with a population of between 2,500 to 99,000 people --
were the clear second choices while rural areas were a distant last. These
initial residential patterns differ distinctly from those of the general
population in which urban areas have become the overwhelming first choice
since 1960 (accounting for almost half of the population) followed by an
almost equal preference (of about 25 percent each) for central cities and
rural areas.
The Census information on the foreign-born population in 1980 vividly
demonstrates the effect that immigration is having on the population of a
few large metropolitan areas. In 1980, for instance, the metropolitan area
with the highest percentage of its population being foreign-born was Miami,
Florida with a phenomenal percentage of 35.2 percent. The second highest
was Los Angeles, California (2l.6 percent) and the third was New York City
(20.8 percent). Thus, the necessity to accommodate the growing immigrant
flow has not fallen evenly. Only a few states and a handful of cities have
borne the brunt of the revival of immigration that has occurred since 1965.
As".the aforementioned DeFreitas and Marshall study found, one effect of
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these disproportinate concentrations has been to retard wage growth in these
large metropolitan areas relative to other metropolitan areas with fewer
immigrant workers. It is also of consequence to note that the settlement
pattern of illegal immigrants has closely resembled the locational preferences
of legal immigrants. In their quest to avoid detection, illegal immigrants
often seek to blend into communities that already have large numbers of
persons from similar ethnic backgrounds. This tendency, of course, only
intensifies the pressures on these few states and cities to accommodate
immigrants.
Thus, the uneven distribution of immigrants means that studies that
focus on the national or state level miss the actual impact of immigration
at the local level in the communities of only a handful of states. But when
one recognizes that those central cities in these few states account for a signi-
ficant portion of the total employment in the nation, there is no reason to
consider these impacts as inconsequential to the economy as a whole.
10 The Short Run, It is likely That Immigrants Contribute to Higher Unemployment
Rates
Chiswick has found for the foreign born males that it takes about five
years for them to reach the same number of weeks worked and to come down to
the same number of weeks of unemployment as native born men.2l This would
suggest that in the short run that immigrant males tend to experience a higher
incidence of unemployment than is the general case. In his findings, it is
also of importance to note that he also found that the fQreign born males
from Mexico, Cuba, and China tended to take longer to reach parity with
native born men than it did the foreign born men from other nations. All
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three of these countries have consistently ranked among the largest sources
of legal immigrants and refugees since 1970. It is logical to conclude that,
if anything, the experiences of the past decade should be less favorable than
those that occurred prior to the 1970s.
Concluding Observations
The prevailing immigration policy of the United States was largely con-
cei ved 'i n the earl y 1950s and the mid- 1960s when i mmigra t i on ,was not a
particularly significant influence on the economy of the nation. As a con-
sequence, the current immigration policy manifests a complete disinterest in
its labor force implications. Perhaps the nation could continue to allow
immigration policy to be excluded from any responsibility to contribute
directly to nation's economic welfare if the economy had not undergone signi-
ficant changes and if the immigration flows of workers had remained relatively
small. But this has not been the case. Hence, the "practice" of allowing
immigration policy to continue to follow its own nepotistic, inflexible,
mechanistic, and massively abused course is a 11uxury" that this nation can
ill afford to continue.
The contemporary economy of the United States is a far cry from the one
into which earlier waves of immigrants entered. The resurgence of immigration
since 1965 has exactly para11e11ed the period when the labor force of the United.
States has sustained unprecedented changes in both size and composition.
With regard to size, the civilian labor force increased by an average of
1.8 million workers each year from 1964 to 1973; and annually by 2.2 million
from 1973 to 1980. Since then the rate of annual increase -- as officially
measured (which means that it is doubtful if the full effects of growing
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numbers of illegal immigrants are included)
-- has declined slightly. None-
theless, in 1984 the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) announced that it is
revising its long term projections of labor force growth from the period 1982
to 1990 to 1.6 million net new workers each year.. (I would argue that even
this projection is conservative -- as all past projections by BLS have
been) .
As for the composition of the labor force, the period since 1965 has
been a period one in which racial and ethnic groups as well as women have
dramatically increased their proportions of the total labor force. The
BLS projects that these patterns will continue -- with women accounting for
two-thirds of the annual growth in the labor forte and blacks about 25 percent
over the next decade. It is certain -- especially if immigration continues
the pattern of the past -- that the Hispanic labor force will also increase
its share disproportionately even though the BLS did not highlight this
group in its projections.
With respect to the entire labor force, the next decade presents the
nation with a unique situation. Because the "baby boom" generation has now
come of age, it is projected that by 1990 the largest single age cohort of
the population will be between the ages of 25 to 44 -- the prime working age
years. It is a period when labor force participation is at its highest for
both males and females. During the late 1980s and early 1990s it is predicted
that there will be more persons in the labor force than not -- including
babies. By 1995, it is expected that 70 percent of the labor force will be
between 25 and 54 years of age. Thus, it is going to be a period in which
there will be mounting pressure on the economy to generate additional employ-
ment opportunities-- especially for women and minorities.
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Under these circumstances, it is clear that the last two decades of
the Twentieth Century are going to be years in which the labor force of the
nation will be confronted with immense pressures to accommodate both the
growth in the number of j?bs seekers as well as to changes in the composition
of the supply of labor. The quest to meet these challenges will be difficult
enough without being undermined by an immigration policy that is seemingly
oblivious to its labor market impacts but which, in actuality, has influential
labor market consequences.
The broad outlines of the policy reform needed to make immigration policy
conform to the economic welfare of the nation are easy to list. With respect
to the annual levels of immigration, there need to be enforceable ceilings.
But they should be ceilings and not established and inflexible numbers. The
actual number of immigrants admitted each year should be responsive to unemployment
trends in the nation. Annual immigration levels should fluctuate inversely
with unemployment trends (as is the practice in Canada). The system should
be capable of responding to changing economic circumstances. The boundary
ceiling should be set by legislation but the precise levels in any given year
should be set administratively. It is implicit if this were to be done, that
the administrative responsibilities for immigration policy should be shifted
back to the U.S. Department of Labor (or some other new agency that might
be created to administer and coordinate all of the nation's human resource
development policies) and away from the U.S. Department of Justice and the
judiciary committees of Congress.
As regard to the actua1 determination of who is admitted as a legal
immigrant each year, the preference system should revert back to the primary
emphasis on occupational preferences that characterized the preference system
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from 1952 to 1965. Family reunification should remain an admission criterion
but not the primary factor as has been the case since 1965. No other nation
in the world allows such a nepotistic and discriminatory doctrine to dominate
its admission system. The occupational preferences should be increased to
at least the pre-1965 level of 50 percent of the available visas. Full
discretion should be given to the administrative agency to decide which oc-
cupations (skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled) are in greatest need at any
particular time and to admit them. Included within this discretionary power
should be the right to give preference to immigrants willing to settle in
regions where labor is scarce. The shift away from the dominance of family
reunification would also allow opportunities forollnew seed immigrants"
(especially for immigrants from Africa which have the most trouble competing
under the existing system) to enter.
The refugee and asylee policies of the nation are the most difficult to
integrate into a policy design that focuses on economic priorities. Obviously,
the United States should continue to participate in the world wide effort
to absorb and to assist in the accommodation of refugees. But experience
clearly indicates that there must be some limitations on the number of refugees
that are to be admitted and where they are to be settled. A legislative
ceiling should be set on the number of refugees to be admitted with the under-
standing that, if special circumstances do arise, more refugees may be admitted
but that offsetting reductions will be made in the number of legal immigrants
in the same or the following year. If a situation should develop that was
truly extraordinary, Congress could legislate a temporary increase in the
numerical boundaries to accommodate such a unique circumstance. The asylee
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issue is presently too complex to discuss in this paper except to note that
the current policy is hopelessly bogged down in a system of judicial paralysis.
Currently, asylees are entitled to almost twice as many levels of appeals of
their status as are provided to convicted murders. It is essential that a more
expedited system of reaching closure in these cases be designed.
ultimate principle for admission should be the same as refugees:
But the
namely, if
asylees permissions are granted, legal immigration should be reduced accordingly.
It is essential that the principle of choice be firmly established in the
operation of the nation's immigration system. Otherwise, one is confronted
with the chaos of the present system where the policy is essentially one
that ratifies what has already happened anyway. Moreover, there is no sense
establishing the concept that total immigrant flows should flunctuate with
domestic labor market conditions if the entire process can be circumvented
by flows from another source. There are already ample signs that the refugee
and asylee system is being used for purpose other than those for which it was
designed -- to avoid persecution for one's political and personal views. The
full cost of assisting refugees and asylees to be prepared from entry into
the labor market should be borne by the federal government and not by local
communities.
All of the preceding suggestions, of course, are predicated on the
assumption that a full-scale effort will be mounted to end the flow of illegal
immigrants into the country. It would make no sense at all to attempt to
construct a positive immigration policy that works in tandum with general
economic policy if the entire process can be easily circumvented. The ap-
propriate policies should be designed to address both the "push" and the "pull II
factors that contribute to the illegal immigration process. They should
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include enhanced deterrent policies (e.g., employer sanctions, enhanced INS
funding, and less reliance on the use of the voluntary departure system) as
well as prevention measures (e.g., extensive economic and technical development
assistance, trade and tariff concessions, and the absolute insistance on the
adherence to human rights principles and the protection of human life from
murder and torture as a prerequisite for receipt of the economic aid and
trade concessions).
The absence of any serious effort to forge an immigration policy based
upon labor market consideratons means that immi-gration policy today functions
as a "wild card" among the nation's array of key labor market policies. Un1i ke
all other elements of economic policy (e.g., fiscal policy, monetary policy,
employment and training policy, education policy, and anti-discrimination
policy) where attempts are made by policymakers to orchestrate the diverse
policy elements into a harmony of action to accomplish particular objectives,
immigration policy has been allowed to meander aimlessly.
that no sensible ~ation can allow to continue.
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